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Unbundling	Efficient	Breach:	An	Experiment	 			ABSTRACT:	 	 Current	 law	 and	 economics	 scholarship	 analyzes	 efficient	 breach	 cases	monolithically.	The	standard	analysis	holds	that	breach	is	efficient	when	performance	of	a	contract	 generates	 a	 negative	 total	 surplus	 for	 the	 parties.	 However,	 by	 simplistically	grouping	efficient	breach	cases	as	of	a	single	kind,	the	prior	literature	overlooks	that	gain-seeking	breaches	might	be	different	from	loss-avoiding	breaches.	To	capture	these	different	motives,	 we	 designed	 a	 novel	 game	 called	 Contract-Breach	 Game	where	we	 exogenously	varied	the	reasons	for	the	breach	—	pursuing	a	gain	or	avoiding	a	loss	—	under	a	specific	performance	remedy.	Results	from	an	incentivized	laboratory	experiment	indicate	that	the	motives	behind	the	breach	induce	sizable	differences	 in	behavior;	subjects	are	 less	willing	to	renegotiate	when	facing	gain-seeking	than	loss-avoiding	breaches,	and	the	compensation	premium	obtained	by	the	promisee	is	higher.	Our	analysis	suggests	that	inequality	aversion	is	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 our	 results;	 indeed,	 inequality-averse	 subjects	 accept	 low	offers	more	often	in	cases	of	loss-avoiding	breaches	than	gain-seeking	breaches.	These	results	give	us	insight	into	the	preferences	and	expectations	of	ordinary	people	in	a	case	of	a	breach.	 		KEYWORDS:	 contract	damages,	efficient	breach,	motives	for	breach,	Contract-Breach	game	JEL	CODES:	 K12,	D86,	C9				
 …“the	 essential	 purpose	 of	 a	 contract	 between	 commercial	 men	 is	 actual	
performance	and	they	do	not	bargain	merely	for	a	promise,	or	for	a	promise	plus	the	
right	to	win	a	lawsuit ”.	
UCC,	Section	2-609,	Comment	1		1.	 	 Introduction		 On	 the	 question	 of	 efficient	 breach,	 there	 exists	 a	 subtle	 tension	 between	 the	economic	 and	 the	 moral	 viewpoints.	 Both	 perspectives	 consider	 the	 failure	 to	 keep	 a	promise	excusable	in	at	least	some	subset	of	cases	when	the	net	social	benefit	of	breach	is																																									 																					
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sufficiently	 large	 (Warkol	 1998,	 p.	 321).	 Yet	 they	 do	 not	 always	 agree	 on	 the	 boundary	conditions	 when	 such	 breaches	 may	 be	 permitted.	 Assuming	 Kaldor-Hicks	 wealth	maximization,	 the	 standard	 economic	 analysis	 contends	 that	 if	 the	 promisor	 gains	 more	than	the	promisee	loses	from	a	breach,	then	a	damages	rule	(allowing	nonperformance	with	compensation)	 will	 be	 efficient.	 Moreover,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 expectation	 damages	 are	perfectly	 compensatory,	 and	 the	 promisee	 is	 thereby	 fully	 compensated,	 such	 a	 breach	would	be	Pareto	efficient,	leaving	neither	party	in	a	worse	position	than	if	the	promisor	had	in	 fact	 performed.	 In	 contrast,	 deontological	 philosophers	 of	 contract	 law	 take	 the	moral	duty	 to	 keep	 one’s	 promises	 as	 a	 foundational	 principle	 of	 contracts,	 which	 cannot	 be	brushed	 aside	 by	 cost-benefit	 analyses	 (Sidhu,	 2006;	Mather,	 1999;	 Fried,	 1981;	 Shiffrin,	2009,	2012).	 	Judicial	 and	 lay	 intuitions	 seem	ambivalent	with	 respect	 to	 the	notion	of	 efficient	breach	 (Warkol,	 1998;	 Baron	 and	 Wilkinson-Ryan,	 2009;	 Zamir	 and	 Medina,	 2010).	 In	general,	 the	 intuitions	 of	 laymen	 seem	 to	 track	 consequentialist	 (economic)	 reasoning	 in	cases	of	loss-avoiding	breach,	while	being	deontological	(moralist)	in	cases	of	gain-seeking	breach.	Consider,	for	instance,	two	firms	renting	a	restaurant	for	their	annual	event.	In	the	first	case,	the	restaurant’s	owners	try	to	cancel	the	reservation	due	to	the	sudden	demise	of	the	chef	and	asks	the	firm	to	breach	the	contract,	offering	some	compensation,	as	replacing	the	chef	 in	haste	would	be	 too	costly.	 In	 the	second	case,	 instead,	 the	restaurant’s	owners	want	to	breach	the	contract	because	they	received	a	better	offer	from	another	group,	willing	to	 rent	 the	 space	 on	 the	 same	 date.	We	 believe	 that	 one	might	well	 be	more	 inclined	 to	forego	 performance	 and	 ask	 for	 a	 lower	 compensation	 in	 the	 first	 (loss-avoiding	 breach)	rather	than	in	the	second	example	(gain-seeking	breach).	This	thought	experiment	suggests	that	 the	 distinction	 between	 loss-avoiding	 and	 gain-seeking	 breach	 may	 be	 analytically	important.		 In	 line	with	 our	 intuition,	 survey-based	 studies	 conducted	 in	 recent	 years	 (Baron	and	 Wilkinson-Ryan,	 2009)	 suggest	 that	 lay	 intuitions	 about	 the	 excusableness	 of	nonperformance	are	 surprisingly	nuanced.	 Survey	participants	were	 tolerant	of	breach	 in	cases	 where	 the	 promisor	 sought	 to	 pay	 damages	 in	 lieu	 of	 performance	 to	 mitigate	unanticipated	 costs	 (“loss-avoiding	 breach”).	 Yet	 they	 were	 unwilling	 to	 excuse	performance	when	the	promisor	breached	to	pursue	a	better	deal	(“gain-seeking	breach”).	  Existing	empirical	evidence	on	these	issues	relies	exclusively	on	anecdotic	evidence	from	 court	 cases,	 and	 from	 non-incentivized	 surveys.	 Unfortunately,	 data	 about	 actually	
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occurring	 breaches	 are	 scarce.	 Moreover,	 comparing	 real-world	 loss-avoiding	 and	 gain-seeking	 breaches	 is	 difficult,	 as	many	 important	 variables	 –	 interested	parties,	 amount	 of	surplus	generated	by	the	contract,	available	 information,	etc.	–	may	vary	 from	one	case	to	the	 other,	 hence	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 draw	 any	 inference.	 Economics	 reasons,	 such	 as	allocative	 efficiency,	 productive	 efficiency,	 restrained	 incentives,	 information-forcing	effects,	 and	 competitive	 effects	 could	 also	 drive	 any	 observed	 difference	 (see	 Parisi	 and	Porat,	2016).	In	this	paper,	we	adopt	a	novel	approach	to	the	problem,	and	test	whether	the	motives	 behind	 a	 breach	 are	 behaviorally	 relevant	 by	 means	 of	 a	 controlled	 laboratory	experiment.	We	utilize	an	incentivized	economic	experiment	granting	tight	control	over	the	relevant	parameters	and	allowing	to	exogenously	manipulate	the	variables	of	 interest.	We	indeed	 understand	 incentivized	 experiments	 as	 a	 new	 and	 important	 source	 of	 evidence,	that	could	complement	real-world	and	survey	data.	 	We	 introduce	 a	 novel	 Contract-Breach	 Game,	 where	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 sign	 a	binding	 contract	 and,	 afterwards,	 a	 shock	might	occur.	We	exogenously	vary	 the	 shock	 to	simulate	loss-avoiding	and	gain-seeking	breaches.	As	specific	performance	remedies	apply	to	 the	 contract,	 the	 promisee	 can	 force	 the	 promisor	 to	 perform	 the	 act(s)	 stated	 in	 the	contract,	unless	both	parties	agree	on	the	compensation	and	cancel	the	contract.	This	study	is	 the	 first	 to	 investigate	 these	 issues	 in	a	non-hypothetical,	 strategic	environment,	where	subjects	 make	 decisions	 with	 real	 pecuniary	 consequences,	 both	 for	 themselves	 and	 for	other	 participants	 of	 the	 experiment.	 Our	 results	 confirm	 that,	 broadly	 speaking,	 lay	intuition	finds	empirical	support:	the	promisees	require	a	higher	compensation	to	consent	to	 gain-seeking	 than	 to	 loss-avoiding	 breaches.	 Interesting	 enough,	 we	 can	 provide	 a	behavioral	explanation	for	the	observed	difference.	Our	results	are	 in	 line	with	behavioral	arguments	suggesting	that	people	dislike	highly	unequal	distributions	of	wealth	(Fehr	and	Schmidt,	1999;	Bolton	and	Ockenfels,	2000).	More	specifically,	inequality-averse	subjects	in	our	 experiment	 are	more	willing	 to	 accept	 a	 low	 offer	 in	 cases	 of	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	than	 gain-seeking	 breaches.	 These	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 results	 of	 a	 recent	experiment	by	Mittlaender	Leme	de	Souza	(2016),	who	investigates	how	the	perception	of	the	moral	value	of	a	breach	depends	on	the	breach’s	consequences,	and	shows	that	breaches	aimed	at	avoiding	unanticipated	unequal	outcomes	are	generally	considered	as	moral.	 	The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	Section	2,	we	review	the	moral	and	economic	arguments	for	efficient	breach	in	the	prior	literature.	In	Section	3,	we	present	the	Contract-Breach	Game	and	describe	the	experimental	design.	In	Section	4,	we	present	the	results	of	
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our	experiment,	which	show	that	people’s	reactions	differ	with	respect	to	gain-seeking	and	loss-avoiding	 breaches,	 while	 remaining	 undistinguishable	 across	 seller-breaches	 and	buyer-breaches	–	consistent	with	our	intuition.	In	Section	5,	we	conclude	with	a	summary	of	our	results	and	possible	policy	implications.	 We	also	explain	the	limits	of	our	conclusions	given	the	design	and	nature	of	our	experiment. 
 
2.	 	 Efficient	Breach:	Moral	vs.	Economic	Arguments	  	 A	 representative	 of	 the	 moral	 perspective	 on	 efficient	 breach	 is	 Sheana	 Shiffrin	(2007).	 Shiffrin	 argues	 that	 contracts	 create	 two	 distinct	 obligations:	 one	 legal	 and	 one	moral.	Both	obligations	are	grounded	in	the	“promise	principle.”	In	her	view,	the	problem	is	that,	 by	 allowing	 parties	 to	 deviate	 from	 their	 legal	 promise	 via	 efficient	 breach,	 the	 law	implicitly	 encourages	 the	 violation	 of	 their	 moral	 promise.5	 Shiffrin	 brings	 to	 fore	 the	tension	between	 the	 legal	and	moral	norms,	questioning	 the	coherence	of	 contract	 law	as	being	at	the	same	time	grounded	upon	and	indifferent	to	promise-keeping.	 	Several	 law	 and	 economics	 scholars	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 moral	 arguments	against	 efficient	 breach,	 attempting	 to	 make	 the	 economic	 argument	 more	 palatable	 for	non-economists.	Shavell	(2006)	observed	that,	while	efficient	breach	can	be	immoral	when	the	awarded	damages	are	 less	 than	expectation	damages,	moral	 considerations	 should	be	tempered	by	the	understanding	that	contracts	are	necessarily	incomplete	promises	and	that	generally	parties	would	have	agreed	to	an	expectation	damages	remedy	if	they	had	bothered	to	 select	 a	 remedy	 ex	 ante.	 Similar	 arguments	 arise	 in	 the	 work	 of	 other	 scholars	 who	suggest	 that	 the	cost-benefit	analysis	underlying	the	notion	of	efficient	breach	reflects	 the	implicit	will	 of	 the	 contracting	 parties	 (Shavell,	 2009;	Markovits	 and	 Schwartz,	 2011	 and	2012).	 	Moral	 theorists	have	not	 found	 these	defenses	of	efficient	breach	convincing.	The	argument	that	in	a	hypothetical	complete	contract	the	parties	would	have	included	a	right	to	breach	in	their	agreement	leaves	a	fundamental	question	unanswered.	If	a	right	to	breach	truly	 reflects	 the	 contracting	 parties’	 preferences	 and	 natural	 expectations	 (such	 as	 to	amount	 to	 the	 implied	 will	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 them),	 how	 do	 we	 explain	 the	 promisees’																																									 																					5	 Shiffrin	(2007,	p.	708).	
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distaste	 for	 efficient	 breach	 even	 when	 full	 compensation	 is	 granted?6	 Furthermore,	Macaulay	 (2000)	 points	 out	 that,	 although	 crude	 practices	 of	 efficient	 breach	 could	 be	observed	 in	 one-shot	 contractual	 interactions,	 when	 parties	 are	 involved	 in	 a	 relational	contract	they	are	less	likely	to	make	use	of	efficient	breach.	This	view	is	similarly	embraced	by	 the	 Official	 Comments	 to	 the	 Uniform	 Commercial	 Code:	 “This	 section	 rests	 on	 the	recognition	of	the	fact	that	the	essential	purpose	of	a	contract	between	commercial	men	is	actual	performance	and	they	do	not	bargain	merely	for	a	promise,	or	for	a	promise	plus	the	right	to	win	a	lawsuit.”	(UCC,	Section	2-609,	Comment	1).	Hence,	the	question	arises	again:	if	efficient	 breach	 reflects	 the	 parties'	 preferences	 and	 natural	 expectations	 in	 one-shot	relationships,	why	is	it	the	case	that	repeat-players	do	not	take	advantage	of	their	right	to	breach	in	their	relational	contracts?	 	A	 possible	 answer	 to	 these	 objections	 comes	 from	 a	 general	 complaint	 about	efficient	 breach:	 expectation	 damages	 rarely	 make	 the	 promisee	 whole	 in	 practice.	 This	complaint	 is	 echoed	 by	 several	 authors	 and	 is	 by	 most	 scholars	 accepted	 as	 an	uncontroversial	 fact	 in	contract	practice	(Fried,	2007;	Goetz	and	Scott,	1980;	Muris,	1983;	Shavell,	 2009).	 But	 if	 imperfect	 compensation	 is	 what	 drives	 the	 wedge	 between	 the	economic	 and	 non-economic	 attitudes	 toward	 efficient	 breach,	 we	 should	 expect	 the	promisee’s	 disappointment	 for	 the	 breach	 to	 be	 a	 function	 of	 under-compensation;	 or	 at	least,	 the	 observed	 distaste	 for	 efficient	 breach	 should	 be	 invariant	 with	 respect	 to	 the	circumstances	 that	 led	 to	 the	breach.	Yet	a	survey	research	by	Baron	and	Wilkinson-Ryan	(2009)	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 circumstances	 matter.	 In	 particular,	 as	 Wilkinson-Ryan	 &	Hoffman	suggest	(2010),	since	the	breach	of	the	contract	is	conceived	by	the	promisee	as	an	exploitation	and	betrayal,	he	would	suffer	a	psychological	harm	and	react	accordingly.	 	 	 	These	problems	and	objections	challenge	the	very	core	of	the	incomplete-contract	and	implied-consent	arguments	used	by	law	and	economics	scholars	in	defense	of	efficient	breach.	 In	 this	paper	we	wish	 to	 consider	 these	 challenges	 seriously,	 stepping	away	 from	the	economic	vs.	non-economic	discursive	dichotomy,	in	the	search	for	behavioral	evidence	that	 could	help	develop	a	more	nuanced	 theory	of	 efficient	breach	 and	possibly	 reconcile	the	different	views.	 																																										 																					6	 Macaulay	 (2000)	 observes	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 other	 factors	 is	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 the	promisees’	distaste	for	breach,	even	when	full	compensation	is	granted.	 	 	
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3.	 Experimental	Design	and	Predictions		 To	 test	whether	 the	 desirability	 of	 the	 option	 to	 breach	 varies	 –	 from	 a	 layman’s	perspective	 –	 depending	 on	 the	 circumstances,	 we	 designed	 a	 Contract-Breach	 Game	 in	which	 the	 contract	 gives	 the	 promisee	 the	 option	 to	 force	 performance	 –	 i.e.,	 specific	performance.7	 Under	specific	performance,	a	breach	is	allowed	only	if	the	parties	reach	an	agreement	to	resolve	the	contract	with	the	payment	of	compensation	by	the	promisor	to	the	promisee.	 The	 Contract-Breach	 Game	 allows	 us	 to	 study	 how	 frequently	 this	 efficient	agreement	to	breach	is	reached	and	whether	the	compensation	paid	by	the	promisor	to	the	promisee	is	higher	 in	some	circumstances	rather	than	others.	We chose specific performance 
as our background remedy, because only if the occurrence of the breach is conditional on the 
consent of both parties, as is the case with specific performance, it is possible to measure the 
promisee's reaction to loss avoiding and to gain seeking breaches. 	In	our	novel	game,	buyers	and	sellers	are	forced	to	enter	into	an	exogenously	given	contract	yielding	equal	profits	 to	both	parties.	After	 the	 contract	 is	 formed,	 an	exogenous	shock	may	increase	the	production	cost	for	the	seller	or	decrease	the	expected	value	of	the	good	for	the	buyer	(loss-avoiding	breach),	or	it	may	provide	either	the	buyer	or	the	seller	a	more	profitable	outside	option	(gain-seeking	breach).	To	 test	 if	 there	 is	a	difference	 if	 the	party	asking	for	a	breach	is	the	seller	or	the	buyer,	we	implemented	two	treatments.	In	the	
Sellers	 treatment,	 the	shock	only	 impacts	the	seller,	either	 increasing	the	production	costs	or	introducing	the	availability	of	a	new	opportunity	to	sell	the	good.	In	the	Buyers	treatment,	the	 shock	 only	 impacts	 the	 buyer,	 either	 decreasing	 the	 buyer’s	 valuation	 of	 the	 good,	 or	introducing	the	opportunity	to	acquire	the	good	elsewhere.	The	 experimental	 methodology	 allows	 us	 to	 have	 tight	 control	 over	 all	 the	parameters	 of	 the	 game.	 In	 naturally	 occurring	 contracts,	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 have	 a	precise	estimate	of	many	of	the	relevant	parameters,	such	as	the	value	of	the	good	for	the	
																																								 																					7	 This	breach	remedy	is	common	in	European	legal	systems,	where	remedies	are	limited	to	compensatory	 damages	 in	 fewer	 cases	 than	 in	 common	 law	 jurisdictions.	 (Fransworth,	 §	12.4,	 p.	 765-70).	 Unlike	 European	 systems,	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	 allow	 unilateral	breaches	 quite	 liberally,	 protecting	 promisees	 only	 with	 the	 award	 of	 compensatory	damages.	
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buyer,	 the	 cost	 for	 the	 seller,	 or	 the	 available	 alternative	 contracting	 opportunities.	Moreover,	 the	 initial	 price	 could	 already	 incorporate	 a	 premium	 for	 unrealized	 but	foreseeable	future	circumstances	(e.g.,	possible	increase	in	production	costs).	The	Contract-Breach	 game	 allows	 us	 to	 hold	 all	 these	 variables	 constant	 and	 to	 manipulate	 only	 one	element	at	a	time.	  In	the	following,	we	describe	the	Contract-Breach	Game	in	greater	detail. 	
3.1	 	 Contract-Breach	Game	 		Participants	are	randomly	assigned	the	role	of	buyer	or	seller,	and	matched	in	pairs.	An	exogenously	given	contract	stipulates	that	the	seller	transfers	a	good	to	the	buyer	for	a	price	of	90	experimental	currency	units	(ECUs).	The	ex-ante	production	cost	for	the	seller	is	set	to	80	ECUs,	while	the	ex-ante	value	of	the	good	for	the	buyer	is	set	to	100	ECUs.	Hence,	the	contract	produces	a	surplus	of	20	ECUs	to	be	divided	equally	between	the	two	parties.	After	 the	 contract	 is	 signed,	 however,	 an	 exogenous	 shock	 may	 occur	 and	 change	 the	production	cost	or	the	expected	value	of	the	good,	or	provides	a	better	contract	opportunity	with	 a	 third	 party.8	 As	 we	 anticipated,	 the	 contract	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 specific	 performance	
remedy,	i.e.,	either	party	can	force	the	other	to	fulfill	the	contract	obligation.	 	We	 implemented	 two	 treatments:	 Sellers	 and	 Buyers	 (Table	 1).	 In	 the	 Sellers	treatment,	the	shock	only	impacts	the	seller,	either	increasing	the	production	costs	(from	80	to	110	ECUs)	or	 introducing	 the	availability	of	a	new	opportunity	 to	sell	 the	good	(at	110	instead	of	90	ECUs).	In	the	former	case,	the	seller	may	breach	the	contract	to	avoid	a	loss	of	20	ECUs	 (Table	1,	Case	1),	while	 in	 the	 latter	he	may	breach	 to	pursue	a	gain	 of	20	ECUs	(Case	2).	 In	 the	Buyers	 treatment,	 the	shock	only	 impacts	 the	buyer,	either	decreasing	 the	buyer’s	 valuation	 of	 the	 good	 from	 100	 to	 70	 ECUs,	 or	 introducing	 the	 opportunity	 to	acquire	the	good	elsewhere	(at	70	rather	than	90	ECUs).	In	the	former	case,	the	buyer	may	breach	to	avoid	a	loss	(Table	1,	Case	3),	while	in	the	latter	he	may	breach	to	pursue	a	gain	(Case	4).	Each	participant	was	exposed	to	only	one	treatment.	To	 better	 understand	 the	 notation	 and	 the	 situation	 under	 analysis,	 consider	 for																																									 																					
8	 More	details	on	the	likelihood	of	the	shock	are	provided	below.	
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example	Case	1	in	Table	1,	where	the	production	costs	of	a	seller	 increase	from	80	to	110	ECUs.	If	the	contract	is	fulfilled,	the	seller	loses	20	ECUS	(recall	the	selling	price	is	equal	to	90	ECUs);	hence	 the	 total	 surplus	 is	negative	(-10	ECUs).9	 Given	 the	specific	performance	remedy,	 a	 promisor	 can	 breach	 the	 contract	 only	 if	 the	 promisee	 agrees,	 accepting	 some	form	 of	 monetary	 compensation,	 K,	 in	 lieu	 of	 performance.	 If	 the	 buyer	 accepts	 a	compensation	K,	the	total	surplus	is	0	ECUs.10	 In	both	treatments,	resolution	of	the	contract	after	any	type	of	shock	is	efficient,	as	it	increases	the	total	surplus	by	10	ECUs.	 			
																																								 																					9	 In	 this	example	 the	seller	 loses	20	ECUs	and	the	buyer	earns	10	ECUs;	 the	 total	surplus	under	performance	is	hence	negative	(-10	ECUs).	10	 In	this	case,	the	seller	loses	K	ECUs	and	the	buyer	earns	K	ECUs;	the	total	surplus	under	breach	is	hence	zero.	
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Structure	 of	 the	 stage	 game.	Buyers	 and	 sellers	 are	 randomly	matched	 in	 pairs,	and	go	through	the	following	steps:11	
Stage	0:	the	buyer	and	the	seller	are	informed	about	the	contract	terms.	 	
Stage	 1:	 an	 exogenous	 shock	 may	 happen	 and	 the	 value	 of	 the	 good	 for	 the	 buyer	 can	decrease	 (loss-avoiding	 breach)	 or	 a	 new	 seller	 can	 be	 introduced,	 offering	 a	 lower	 price	
																																								 																					11	 In	 the	 following,	 we	 will	 describe	 the	 game	 for	 the	 Buyers	 treatment.	 In	 the	 Sellers	treatment,	roles	were	reversed	in	stages	2-5.	In	both	treatments,	stages	0,	1,	and	6	lasted	10	seconds	each.	
 Sellers treatment Buyers treatment 
Loss-avoiding breach 
Case 1: seller breaches to avoid 
loss (↑ costs=110)  
Contract fulfilled  𝜋"# = −20;	𝜋*# = 10;	𝑆# = −10 
Efficient breach 𝜋"*- = −𝐾;	𝜋**- = 𝐾;	𝑆*- = 0 
 
Case 3: buyer breaches to avoid 
loss (↓ value=70)  
Contract fulfilled   𝜋*# = −20;	𝜋"# = 10;	𝑆# = −10 
Efficient breach 𝜋**- = −𝐾;	𝜋"*- = 𝐾;	𝑆*- = 0 
 
   
Gain- seeking breach 
Case 2: seller breaches to pursue 
a gain (↑ price=110)  
Contract fulfilled 𝜋"# = 10;	𝜋*# = 10;	𝑆# = 20 
Efficient breach 𝜋"*- = 30 − 𝐾; 𝜋**- = 𝐾; 𝑆*- = 30 
 
Case 4: buyer breaches to pursue 
a gain (↓ price=70)  	
Contract fulfilled  𝜋*# = 10;	𝜋"# = 10;	𝑆# = 20 
 Efficient breach  𝜋**- = 30 − 𝐾; 𝜋"*- = 𝐾; 𝑆*- = 30 
 
   
Inefficient breach 
Case 5: no variations for the 
seller   
Contract fulfilled 𝜋"# = 10;	𝜋*# = 10;	𝑆# = 20 
Inefficient breach 𝜋"*- = −𝐾;	𝜋**- = 𝐾; 𝑆*- = 0 
  
Case 6: no variations for the 
buyer   
Contract fulfilled 𝜋*# = 10;	𝜋"# = 10;	𝑆# = 20 
Inefficient breach 𝜋**- = −𝐾; 𝜋"*- = 𝐾; 𝑆*- = 0 
   
Notes:  𝜋01	 denotes the earnings of party i=(s=seller; b=buyer) under the circumstances 
j=(c=execution of contract; br=breach) and K is the accepted compensation to breach the 
contract. 76 subjects participated in the Sellers treatment and 82 in the Buyers treatment. Each 
subject, regardless of the treatment, played the contract-breach game for 18 periods, with 
random matching, and experienced 6 negative shocks (loss-avoiding breach), 6 positive shocks 
(gain-seeking breach), and 6 situations in which the initial conditions did not change 
(inefficient breach). 	
	
Table	1:	 	 Four	Cases	of	Efficient	Breach	
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(gain-seeking	breach).	 If	 none	of	 the	 two	 conditions	 is	 realized,	 the	 terms	of	 the	 contract	remain	the	same	as	in	Stage	0.	
Stage	2:	 the	 buyer	 chooses	whether	 to	 fulfill	 his	 existing	 obligation	 or	 to	 renegotiate	 the	contract.12	 If	the	contract	is	fulfilled	the	period	is	over.	
Stages	 3-5:	 there	 are	 at	most	 three	 renegotiation	 rounds.	 In	 the	 first	 one,	 the	 buyer	 can	offer	any	positive	 integer	0≤K≤20,	 to	compensate	the	seller	 for	the	breach	of	 the	contract.	The	seller	can	either	accept	the	offer	or	enter	the	second	renegotiation	round	and	make	a	counteroffer	 (between	0	 and	20).	 If	 the	 seller	makes	 a	 counteroffer,	 the	 buyer	 can	 either	accept	it	or	make	a	last	counteroffer	to	the	seller.	If	an	offer	or	counteroffer	is	accepted,	the	contract	is	resolved	and	the	parties’	payoffs	are	determined	according	to	the	agreed	terms.	If	by	the	end	of	the	third	renegotiation	round	no	agreement	is	reached,	the	original	contract	is	enforced	through	specific	performance.13	
Stage	6:	the	parties	are	informed	about	the	outcome	of	the	renegotiation	phase,	their	own	earnings,	 and	 the	 earnings	 of	 their	 counterpart.	 Subjects	 can	 always	 see	 their	 cumulative	earnings	(including	their	initial	endowment)	on	the	screen.14	 		 Table	2	presents	the	payoffs	of	the	two	parties	in	case	an	offer	(K)	is	accepted	by	the	promisee	as	compensation	 for	 the	breach.	 It	reveals	 that	any	compensation	K	between	10	and	 20	 generates	 a	 Pareto-improvement	with	 respect	 to	 the	 outcome	 that	would	 emerge	with	the	performance	of	the	contract.		
																																								 																					
12	 This	option	is	available	even	when	no	shock	occurs.	13	 In	each	round,	subjects	have	10	seconds	to	accept	an	offer,	and	30	seconds	to	make	an	offer.	 If	 a	 subject	 does	 not	 accept	 or	 reject	 the	 offer	 within	 10	 seconds,	 the	 offer	 is	automatically	 rejected,	 while	 in	 case	 no	 offer	 is	 made	 before	 the	 30	 seconds	 elapse,	 a	counteroffer	equal	to	the	most	profitable	option	for	the	offering	party	is	automatically	made	(20	in	Stage	4,	and	0	in	Stage	5).	 	14	 Subjects	are	paid	for	their	choices	in	all	18	periods.	 	
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 Role No Accepted compensation K  Breach 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
            
Gain- 
seeking 
Promisor - 
Recipient 10 30 29 28 [...] 20 [...] 15 [...] 10 
Promisee - 
Dictator 10 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
            
Loss- 
avoiding 
Promisor - 
Recipient -20 0 -1 -2 [...] -10 [...] -15 [...] -20 
Promisee - 
Dictator 10 0 1 2 [...] 10 [...] 15 [...] 20 
	
Table	2:	 	 Efficient	Breach	and	Accepted	Compensation.	
Sequence	of	events,	repetitions,	and	matching	groups.	Subjects	play	18	periods	of	the	stage	game,	 in	a	 fixed	role:	either	as	a	buyer	or	as	a	seller.	At	the	beginning	of	each	period,	 new	 pairs	 of	 buyer	 and	 sellers	 are	 randomly	 formed,	 and	 identities	 remain	undisclosed.	This	eliminates	any	reputational	concerns	and	preserves	 the	one-shot	nature	of	the	contract-breach	game.	 	 	The	 sequence	 of	 the	 events	 is	 predetermined	 and	 constant	 across	 treatments,	 but	unknown	 to	 subjects.	 Each	 event	 –	 no-shock,	 positive	 shock,	 and	negative	 shock	 –	 occurs	
exactly	six	times.	This	implies	that	in	our	setup	the	same	person	takes	decisions	in	both	gain-seeking	 and	 loss-avoiding	 scenarios,	 as	well	 as	 in	 scenarios	 in	which	 breach	 is	 inefficient	(i.e.,	no	exogenous	shocks	occur).	Participants	are	truthfully	informed	that	the	sequence	of	the	 events	 across	 periods	 is	 given	 and	 cannot	 be	 influenced	 by	 previous	 transactions.	However,	 they	 are	not	 aware	of	 the	 frequency	with	which	 each	 event	would	happen	 (see	Instructions	in	Appendix).	 	Our	setup	resembles	situations	in	which	the	parties	anticipate	a	breach	as	a	possible	scenario.	While	we	 acknowledge	 that	 on	 some	 occasions,	 the	 breach	 is	 a	 surprise	 for	 the	promisee,	sufficiently	sophisticated	parties	(such	as	business	transactors)	should	anticipate	at	the	time	of	contracting,	that	the	promisor	might	have	an	interest	to	breach	in	the	future,	and	that	a	renegotiation	might	follow.	 		 In	each	session,	participants	are	divided	into	two	matching	groups.	Pairs	of	buyers	and	sellers	are	always	formed	within	each	matching	group,	so	the	two	matching	groups	in	each	 session	 are	 independent	 of	 each	 other	 because	 there	 is	 no	 possibility	 of	 contagion	
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between	them.15	 Participants	in	the	first	matching	group	face	the	“loss-avoiding”	case	in	the	first	period,	the	“gain-seeking”	case	in	the	second	period,	and	the	no-event	case	in	the	third	period.	 For	participants	 in	 the	 second	matching	group	 the	order	of	 the	 events	 in	 the	 first	two	periods	 is	 reversed.	 From	period	4	onwards,	 the	 sequence	of	 the	 events	 is	 randomly	drawn	(with	no	repositioning)	for	each	of	the	two	matching	groups,	and	is	constant	across	all	sessions.	This	set-up	allows	for	a	clear	comparison	across	subjects	of	the	effects	of	gain-seeking	and	loss-avoiding	breaches	on	the	outcome	of	the	renegotiation.	 	We	decided	to	let	participant	interact	for	many	periods	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	there	is	widespread	experimental	evidence	that	subjects	might	need	time	to	familiarize	with	a	novel	 task	 in	the	 lab	and	repeated	 interaction	can	facilitate	 learning	and	convergence	to	equilibrium.	 Second,	 being	 able	 to	 vary	 the	 reason	 behind	 the	 breach	 within	 the	 same	treatment	allows	for	a	tighter	control	over	subjects’	behavior,	because	we	can	observe	how	the	same	participants	react	in	response	to	such	an	exogenous	variation,	holding	individual	characteristics	constant.	This	makes	it	possible	to	establish	a	clean	causal	link	between	the	motives	of	the	breach,	and	the	reaction	they	trigger.	Also,	remember	that	in	our	experiment	subjects	are	randomly	re-matched	at	the	beginning	of	every	round	so	to	exclude	any	form	of	reputational	effects	and	preserve	the	one-shot	nature	of	the	strategic	situation.		
Dictator	 game	 and	 inequality	 aversion.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 18	 periods	 of	 play,	subjects	 are	 randomly	matched	 in	 pairs	 and	 asked	 to	 play	 two	 dictator	 games	 (DG1	 and	DG2),	intended	to	capture	individual	dispositions	toward	inequality	in	a	set-up	that	closely	matches	 the	 one	 they	 previously	 played.	 In	 DG1,	 subjects	 have	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 split	 30	ECUs	 between	 themselves	 and	 a	 randomly	 chosen	 counterpart;	 they	 can	 give	 to	 the	counterpart	 any	 number	 of	 ECUs	 between	 10	 and	 30.	 In	 DG2,	 subjects	must	 choose	 how	many	ECUs	(between	0	and	20)	to	transfer	from	the	counterpart's	account	to	their	own.	All	subjects	played	both	games	in	the	role	of	the	dictator.	Roles	of	dictator	and	recipient	were	
																																								 																					15	 We	have	4	sessions	for	each	treatment,	for	a	total	of	16	matching	groups	equally	divided	across	Sellers	and	Buyers	treatment.	Each	matching	group	included	between	8	and	12	 participants,	 evenly	 divided	 between	 buyers	 and	 sellers.	 In	 our	 analyses,	 we	 will	consider	each	matching	group	as	an	independent	observation.	
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assigned	at	random	after	all	subjects	made	their	choices.	Only	one	of	the	two	dictator	games	was	selected	at	random	for	payment	to	rule	out	hedging	between	decisions.	As	 illustrated	 in	Table	2,	 the	payoffs	of	 the	dictator	 in	DG1	correspond	to	 those	of	the	 promisee	 in	 the	 “gain-seeking”	 case	 of	 our	 Contract-Breach	 Game,	while	 those	 of	 the	recipient	correspond	to	the	payoffs	of	the	promisor.	A	similar	mapping	exists	between	the	payoffs	 in	DG2	and	 those	of	 the	 two	parties	 in	 the	 “loss-avoiding”	 case	of	 the	main	game.	However,	in	the	Contract-Breach	Game	the	level	of	compensation	depends	on	the	interplay	of	promisor	and	promisee,	while	 in	 the	dictator	games	any	 type	of	 strategic	 interaction	 is	stripped	 away	 and	 the	 outcome	 is	 completely	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 dictator.	 By	 observing	behavior	in	a	set-up	where	bargaining	does	not	play	any	role,	we	can	single	out	inequality	aversion	as	a	potential	driver	of	behavior	also	in	the	main	game.	To	this	aim,	it	is	important	that	payoffs	are	as	comparable	as	possible	between	the	different	parts	of	the	experiment.		
Procedures.	The	experiment	 involved	158	subjects;	76	 in	the	Sellers	 treatment	and	82	 in	the	Buyers	 treatment.	 	 We	conducted	8	sessions	–	equally	divided	across	 treatments	–	at	the	 Bologna	 Laboratory	 for	 Experiments	 in	 Social	 Sciences	 (BLESS)	 in	 April	 2013.	 The	number	of	participants	 in	each	session	ranged	 from	16	 to	22.	Two	matching	groups	were	used	 in	each	session,	 for	a	 total	of	8	 independent	observations	per	 treatment.	No	subjects	participated	in	more	than	one	session.	The	stage	game	was	repeated	for	18	periods,	hence	giving	us	a	total	of	684	pairs	in	the	Sellers	treatment	and	738	pairs	in	the	Buyers	treatment.	Participants	were	mostly	 college	 students	 recruited	 through	 ORSEE	 (Greiner,	 2015).	 The	experiment	was	programmed	and	conducted	using	the	z-Tree	software	(Fischbacher,	2007).	Upon	arrival,	participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	private	cubicles	to	avoid	eye	contact;	a	 paper	 copy	 of	 the	 instructions	was	 distributed	 before	 each	 part,	 and	 instructions	were	read	out	 loud	 to	ensure	 common	knowledge.16	 Before	proceeding	 to	 the	main	part	of	 the	experiment,	all	subjects	had	to	correctly	answer	a	series	of	computerized	control	questions.	No	 form	of	 communication	 between	 the	 participants	was	 allowed	 in	 the	 experiment.	 The	average	 session	 lasted	 approximately	 1.5	 hours.	 All	 earnings	 in	 the	 experiment	 were	expressed	 in	ECUs	and	 converted	at	 the	 end	of	 the	 session	at	 the	 rate	of	€1	 for	 every	20	ECUs.	There	was	no	show-up	fee,	but	subjects	received	an	 initial	endowment	of	150	ECUs	
																																								 																					16	 Instructions	are	reported	in	Appendix	B.	
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(€7.5)	at	the	beginning	of	the	first	period	of	the	contract	breach	game,	to	accommodate	for	potential	losses,	and	avoid	any	issue	of	limited	liability.	Subjects	were	paid	privately	in	cash	at	the	end	of	the	session;	the	average	earning	was	€14.50.		 	
3.2	 	 Theoretical	Predictions	and	Procedures	 	
 In	the	Contract-Breach	Game,	rational	parties	should	agree	to	forego	performance	of	the	 contract	 whenever	 either	 type	 of	 event	 occurs,	 and	 the	 promisee	 should	 accept	 any	compensation	higher	than	10;	hence,	the	promisor	should	offer	exactly	11	under	both	types	of	events.	In	both	DG1	and	DG2,	dictators	should	simply	maximize	their	earnings	and	get	20	ECUs.	 	These	standard	theoretical	predictions	 focus	on	objective	payoffs	and	treat	all	cases	of	 efficient	 breach	 alike	 (Posner,	 2009).	 However,	 there	 are	 economic	 and	 behavioral	arguments	 suggesting	 that	 people	 may	 actually	 treat	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	 differently	from	 gain-seeking	 ones.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 relevant	 strands	 of	 the	 literature	 that	provide	 independent	 rationales	 for	 these	 behavioral	 differences.	 First,	 there	 are	 the	economic	 arguments	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 a	 right	 to	 breach,	 such	 as	 restrained	 incentives,	productive	and	allocative	efficiency	that	can	vary	across	our	four	cases.	In	particular,	Parisi	and	 Porat	 (2016)	 posit	 that	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	 are	more	 desirable	 than	 gain-seeking	ones,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 buyers	 or	 sellers	 are	 the	 promisors.	 Second,	 insights	 from	behavioral	and	experimental	economics	suggest	that	people	tend	to	be	averse	toward	highly	unequal	 distributions	 of	 wealth	 (Fehr	 and	 Schmidt,	 1999;	 Bolton	 and	 Ockenfels,	 2000).	Related	evidence	from	Baron	and	Wilkinson-Ryan	(2009)	also	points	in	the	same	direction.	 	In	the	dictator	game,	 inequality-averse	subjects	should	be	willing	to	sacrifice	part	of	their	 payoff	 –	 hence	 keep	 less	 than	 20	 –	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 distance	 between	 their	earnings	and	those	of	the	recipient.	In	addition,	they	should	keep	less	in	DG1	than	in	DG2,	as	in	 DG1	 the	 distance	 between	 dictator’s	 and	 recipient’s	 payoffs	 is	 minimized	 when	 the	former	keeps	0,	while	in	DG2	this	happens	when	the	dictator	keeps	15.	For	the	same	reason,	in	 the	 Contract-Breach	 Game	 inequality	 aversion	 may	 induce	 promisees	 to	 accept	 lower	offers	when	the	breach	is	loss-avoiding	rather	than	gain-seeking.	We	thus	formulate	three	hypotheses	that	will	guide	our	exposition	of	the	results:		
Hypothesis	 1:	Promisees	will	 enter	 the	 renegotiation	 phase	more	 often	 in	 cases	 of	 loss-avoiding	rather	than	gain-seeking	breaches,	irrespective	of	the	role	of	the	breaching	party.	
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Hypothesis	2:	The	two	parties	will	reach	an	agreement	more	often	in	cases	of	loss-avoiding	than	in	cases	of	gain-seeking	breaches,	irrespective	of	the	role	of	the	breaching	party.	
Hypothesis	3:	When	an	agreement	 is	 reached	to	allow	efficient	breach,	 the	promisee	will	obtain	a	 larger	 share	of	 the	 surplus	as	 compensation	 for	a	gain-seeking	breach	 than	 for	a	loss-avoiding	one.	There	should	be	no	differences	based	on	the	role	of	the	breaching	party.		
4.	 Experimental	Results		We	 provide	 an	 overview	of	 the	 results	 in	 Table	 3,	which	 presents	 the	 average	 per-transaction	profits	and	surplus	by	type	of	breach.	The	data	reveal	 that	 the	realized	(total)	surplus	was	significantly	lower	than	the	theoretical	benchmark	in	all	cases,	suggesting	that	subjects	 were	 not	 always	 able	 or	 willing	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement	 to	 avoid	 the	 inefficient	performance	of	the	contract,	notwithstanding	the	efficiency	gains	from	doing	so.	In	addition,	promisees’	 earnings	 tended	 to	 be	 larger	 than	 predicted,	 while	 lower	 than	 predicted	earnings	were	obtained	by	promisors.	This	indicates	that	even	when	a	breach	was	allowed,	subjects	split	the	surplus	in	a	way	that	was	generally	more	favorable	to	the	promisee	than	predicted	by	theory.		
Event Profit Total 
 Promisee Promisor surplus 
Inefficient breach 9.89 9.77 19.66 
 [9.80, 9.99] [9.56, 9.98] [19.40, 19.93] 
 10.00 10.00 20.00 
 Loss- 11.45 -14.11 -2.66 
avoiding [11.15, 11.75] [-14.67, -13.57] [-3.05, -2.28] 
 11.00 -11.00 0.00 
 Gain- 12.18 14.63 26.80 
seeking [11.75, 12.60] [14.05, 15.21] [26.18, 27.43] 
 11.00 19.00 30.00 
Notes: The table reports in bold the average profits per period, while in squared brackets it presents the 95% 
confidence intervals and in italics the theoretical benchmarks. We have 474 observations for each event and role. 
 
Table	3:	 	 Observed	Profits	and	Theoretical	Benchmarks		We	shall	proceed	into	an	analysis	of	the	results,	first	considering	the	frequency	with	which	 subjects	 entered	 the	 renegotiation	 stage	 and	 the	 number	 of	 efficient	 breach	
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agreements	 that	were	reached	(Results	1	and	2).	We	shall	 then	 look	at	 the	division	of	 the	surplus	between	the	parties	(Results	3	and	4).	 		
Do	 promisors	 always	 enter	 the	 renegotiation	 stage?	 Is	 there	 a	 difference	 depending	 on	 the	
reason	for	the	breach?	
	
Result	 1:	 Promisors	 entered	 the	 renegotiation	 phase	 more	 often	 when	 facing	 a	 loss-avoiding	than	a	gain-seeking	breach.	 	Figure	 1	 reports	 the	 frequency	 of	 (forced)	 specific	 performance	 without	renegotiation	 (“no-renegotiation	 rate”),	 divided	 by	 type	 of	 breach.17	 In	 the	 case	 of	 loss-avoiding	breach,	 nearly	 all	 promisors	 accepted	 the	possibility	 to	 renegotiate	 the	 contract.	For	gain-seeking	breaches	a	different	picture	emerges,	as	the	breaching	party	decides	not	to	pursue	the	renegotiation	more	 than	6%	of	 the	 time.	The	difference	between	 loss-avoiding	and	gain-seeking	breaches	is	significant	at	the	1%	level	in	the	first	occurrence	(Chi-squared	test,	 N1=N2=79),	 and	 at	 the	 5%	 level	 when	 pooling	 data	 from	 all	 occurrences	 (Wilcoxon	matched	pairs	test,	N1=N2=16,	all	treatments	pooled).18	 Results	are	confirmed	by	a	series	of	probit	 regressions	 with	 individual-level	 random	 effects	 including	 controls	 for	 subjects’	individual	characteristics	and	experience	(Table	A-1	in	Appendix).	In	line	with	Hypothesis	1,	this	 result	 suggests	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 breach	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 willingness	 of	promisors	to	ask	for	a	renegotiation	despite	the	fact	that	(i)	the	breach	is	always	efficient,	(ii)	 the	surplus	generated	by	the	breach	is	constant	across	conditions,	and	(iii)	 there	 is	no	cost	associated	with	the	renegotiation.	 	
																																								 																					
17	 In	Figure	1	we	consider	efficient	breach	cases	only.	No-renegotiation	is	86.4%	if	there	is	no	 shock	 and	 the	 frequency	 of	 inefficient	 breaches	 is	 1.7%.	 This	 confirms	 that	 the	experimental	 subjects	 correctly	 understood	 the	 incentive	 structure	 of	 the	 situation	 they	faced.	18 	 We	 adopt	 a	 conservative	 approach	 to	 account	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 independence	 of	observations	across	rounds	and	pairs.	If	not	otherwise	specified,	the	unit	of	observation	is	the	average	at	the	matching	group	level	(N=16).	Comparisons	between	renegotiation	rates	for	 gain-seeking	 and	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	 are	 based	 on	 Wilcoxon	 matched	 pairs	 test;	comparisons	between	renegotiation	rates	in	the	Buyer	and	Seller	treatments	are	based	on	Wilcoxon-Mann	Whitney	tests.	Tests	for	the	first	occurrence	are	based	on	Chi-squared	tests	and	treat	each	pair	as	an	independent	unit	of	observation.	 	
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Figure	1:	Cases	of	Forced	Specific	Performance	without	Renegotiation		 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1,	 the	 percentage	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 promisors	 choose	 not	 to	attempt	 renegotiation	 is	 higher	 in	 the	 first	 occurrence,	 as	 compared	 to	 all	 occurrences,	suggesting	 that	subjects	 learn	over	 time	 that	 the	breach	can	be	desirable.	Notice	however	that	the	difference	is	significant	only	in	the	Buyers	treatment	(significant	at	the	1%	level	in	the	 first	occurrence,	N1=N2=41,	and	at	 the	5%	 level	 in	all	occurrences,	N1=N2=8),	while	 in	the	 Sellers	 treatment	 the	 entrance	 rates	 are	 not	 significantly	 different	 depending	 on	 the	reason	for	the	breach.	
	
How	often	do	parties	that	were	willing	to	renegotiate	reach	an	efficient	agreement?	Do	results	
differ	depending	on	the	reason	for	the	breach	and/or	on	the	identity	of	the	breaching	party?	
	
Result	 2:	 For	 parties	 that	 pursued	 renegotiation,	 the	 rates	 of	 successful	 renegotiation	do	not	depend	on	the	reason	for	the	breach	or	the	identity	of	the	breaching	party.		 We	 report	 that	 subjects	 that	 were	 willing	 to	 engage	 in	 renegotiation	 reached	 an	efficient	breach	agreement	in	73.1%	of	the	cases	(Table	A-2	in	Appendix).	In	total,	efficient	breach	 was	 permitted	 in	 70.7%	 of	 the	 instances;	 41.5%	 of	 the	 parties	 that	 successfully	renegotiated	the	contract	reached	agreement	only	in	the	final	round	of	renegotiation.	Only	
18	
22.1%	reached	an	agreement	accepting	the	first	offer	made	by	the	promisor.	When	a	loss-avoiding	 (gain-seeking)	 breach	 occurred,	 73.9%	 (72.3%)	 of	 renegotiations	 were	successfully	 concluded.	 As	 revealed	 by	 a	 Wilcoxon-Mann	 Whitney	 test,	 no	 significant	differences	emerge	depending	on	the	reason	for	the	breach	(p-value>0.1);	the	same	is	true	if	we	consider	each	treatment	separately	or	the	initial	occurrence	only	(p-value>0.1,	Pearson	Chi-squared,	N=73).19	Further,	 the	 data	 indicate	 that,	 with	 experience,	 reaching	 an	 agreement	 on	 an	efficient	 breach	 becomes	 easier.	 In	 the	 first	 occurrence	 of	 a	 shock,	 conditional	 on	renegotiation,	parties	reached	an	agreement	only	58.5%	of	the	time;	this	percentage	jumps	to	 81.0%	 in	 the	 final	 occurrence	 of	 a	 shock,	 and	 the	 difference	 is	 highly	 significant,	according	 to	 a	 Wilcoxon	 signed-rank	 test	 (p-value<0.01,	 N=32).20	 We	 also	 find	 that	 the	success	 rate	 of	 the	 renegotiation	 is	 not	 significantly	 influenced	 by	 the	 identity	 of	 the	breaching	party.	Results	are	similar	if	we	consider	only	the	first	occurrence.	 	These	results	suggest	that	once	parties	accept	the	idea	of	engaging	in	renegotiation,	they	 are	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 renegotiation	 successfully	 at	 the	 same	 rate,	 regardless	 of	 the	reasons	of	 the	underlying	breach.	However,	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	breach	affect	 the	way	 the	surplus	is	split	between	the	parties,	as	discussed	below.	 		
How	do	the	parties	split	the	surplus	of	an	efficient	breach?	Does	the	compensation	obtained	by	
the	promisee	vary	depending	on	the	reason	for	the	breach	and/or	the	identity	of	the	breaching	
party?	 	As	 we	 noted	 above,	 in	 all	 circumstances	 where	 breach	 is	 efficient,	 the	 promisee	should	 receive	 compensation	 of	 11,	 which	 means	 that	 he	 should	 earn	 10%	 more	 by	breaching	 the	contract	 than	when	no	breach	 takes	place.	Let	us	define	 the	 “compensation	premium”	 as	 the	 percentage	 difference	 between	 the	 compensation	 obtained	 by	 the	promisee,	and	the	payoff	he	would	get	through	actual	performance:	CP=(K-10)/10.																																									 																					19	 The	 rates	 of	 success	 of	 the	 renegotiation	phase	 are	72.1%	 (loss-avoiding	breaches)	 vs.	69.9%	(gain-seeking	breaches)	in	the	Sellers	treatment,	and	75.6%	vs.	74.6%	in	the	Buyers	treatment.	20 	 A	 similar	 pattern	 is	 observed	 for	 both	 types	 of	 breaches:	 the	 rate	 of	 successful	renegotiation	 goes	 from	 60.7%	 to	 79.3%	 for	 gain-seeking	 breaches	 (p-value<0.05,	 N=16)	and	from	56.4%	to	82.7%	for	loss-avoiding	breaches	(p-value<0.01,	N=16).	
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Figure	2:	 	 Compensation	Premium		Figure	 2	 reports	 the	 average	 compensation	 premium	 obtained	 by	 the	 promisee	when	 the	 efficient	 breach	 took	 place.	 Overall,	 the	 promisee	 received	 a	 compensation	premium	 of	 26.1%,	 which	 is	 markedly	 higher	 than	 what	 the	 standard	 theory	 predicts.	Indeed,	the	median	accepted	offer	was	13	ECUs	(i.e.,	CP=30%).	
	
Result	 3(a):	 The	 compensation	 premium	 obtained	 by	 the	 promisee	 is	 higher	 for	 gain-seeking	breaches	than	loss-avoiding	breaches.	 	In	 line	with	our	Hypothesis	3,	we	observe	significant	differences	 in	 the	division	of	the	surplus	generated	by	 the	breach	(which	 is	always	equal	 to	10	ECUs),	depending	upon	the	reason	for	the	breach.	Actual	compensations	were	12.0	ECUs	in	loss-avoiding	and	13.2	ECUs	in	gain-seeking	breaches.	This	generated	an	average	compensation	premium	of	20.2%	for	 loss-avoiding	 breaches,	 and	 32.0%	 for	 gain-seeking	 breaches	 (Figure	 2),	 and	 the	difference	 is	 significant	 at	 the	 1%	 level	 (N=16). 21 	 Results	 are	 confirmed	 by	 linear																																									 																					21	 Comparisons	between	offers	and	compensations	between	loss-avoiding	and	gain-seeking	breaches	 are	 based	 on	 Wilcoxon-Mann	 Whitney	 tests	 for	 Period	 1,	 and	 on	 Wilcoxon	matched	pairs	tests	when	considering	all	periods.	 	
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regression	models	with	individual-level	random	effects	and	including	controls	for	subjects’	individual	characteristics	and	for	possible	time	trends	(Table	A-3	in	Appendix,	Model	1-2).	A	significant	 disparity	 in	 compensation	 premiums	 emerged	 both	when	 the	 breaching	 party	was	 the	buyer,	and	when	 it	was	 the	seller	 (p-value<0.05,	N=8;	Table	A-3,	Model	3	and	4).	Interestingly,	the	difference	in	premiums	between	the	two	reasons	for	the	breach	emerged	only	 as	 the	 game	 progressed.	 Despite	 the	 compensation	 premium	 being	 larger	 for	 gain-seeking	 (17.4%)	 than	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	 (7.6%),	 in	 the	 first	 occurrence	 of	 the	 shock,	the	difference	is	not	significant	at	any	conventional	level.	 	
	
Result	3(b):	The	compensation	premium	obtained	by	the	promisee	for	the	efficient	breach	is	not	affected	by	the	role	of	the	promisor.	The	identity	of	the	breaching	party	does	not	seem	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	average	 compensation	premium	obtained	by	 the	 promisee,	which	 is	 on	 average	27.9%	 in	the	Seller	treatment,	and	24.3%	in	the	Buyer	treatment	(p-value>0.1,	N1=N2=16).	This	result	is	consistent	with	the	expectations	expressed	in	the	second	part	of	Hypothesis	3.	However,	a	caveat	 is	 required	here:	 the	 framing	of	our	experiment	 is	only	minimally	 characterized	 in	terms	of	the	differences	between	the	roles	of	buyers	and	sellers,	and	the	efficiency	concerns	that	might	emerge	in	real-life	situations	(Parisi	and	Porat,	2016)	were	not	likely	to	emerge	in	the	laboratory.22	 		
Can	 individual	 attitudes	 toward	 inequality	 explain	 observed	 differences	 in	 compensation	
premiums?	 	
	
Result	4:	Inequality-averse	subjects	accept	low	offers	more	often	in	cases	of	loss-avoiding	breaches	than	gain-seeking	breaches.	Data	 from	renegotiation	suggest	 that	higher	compensation	premiums	are	required	in	 cases	 of	 gain-seeking	 breach	 than	 in	 cases	 of	 loss-avoiding	 breach.	 Despite	 efficiency	gains	 from	the	breach	and	 the	range	of	 the	compensation	premium	being	 identical	across	
																																								 																					22	 Roles	were	indeed	assigned	randomly	and,	for	instance,	there	was	no	difference	between	buyers	 and	 sellers	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 reversibility	 of	 the	 investments	 or	 the	 effect	 on	competitiveness.	
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the	 types	 of	 breaches,	 one	 should	 note	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 inequality—i.e.,	 the	 distance	between	promisor's	and	promisee's	earnings—associated	with	each	compensation	 level	K	varies	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	breach.	Whereas	inequality	monotonically	increases	as	 the	premium	 increases	 in	cases	of	 loss-avoiding	breach,	 inequality	 is	minimized	with	a	50%	 compensation	 premium	 (i.e.,	 an	 accepted	 offer	 of	 15	 ECUs)	 in	 cases	 of	 gain-seeking	breach	 (see	 Table	 2).	 A	 subject	 that	 dislikes	 inequality	 may	 be	 willing	 to	 accept	 a	 small	(perhaps	even	negative)	premium	in	the	loss-avoiding	case	to	reduce	the	distance	between	the	earnings	of	the	two	parties.	However,	the	same	subject	might	ask	for	a	high	premium	in	the	 gain-seeking	 case,	 as	 this	would	 help	 reduce	 inequality.	We	 therefore	 conjecture	 that	inequality-averse	 subjects	may	accept	 low	offers	 for	 loss-avoiding	breaches,	but	 that	 they	will	tend	to	be	less	inclined	to	do	so	for	gain-seeking	breaches.	 	To	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 link	 between	 inequality	 and	 compensation	 premiums,	 let	 us	classify	 promisees	 into	 two	 categories	 based	 on	 DGs’	 choices:	 inequality-tolerant	 and	inequality-averse.	To	this	end,	we	first	define	the	inequality	index,	I,	as	the	sum	of	the	payoff	differences	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 in	DG1	 and	DG2.	 Let	 us	 call	 xi	 the	 amount	 of	money	given	 to	 the	 recipient,	 and	 yi	 the	 amount	 of	 money	 kept	 by	 the	 dictator,	 in	 game	 i.	 The	inequality	 index	 I	 is:	 𝐼 = 𝑥4– 𝑦4 + 	 𝑥8– 𝑦8 .	 The	 average	 inequality	 index	 for	 promisees	was	35	and	the	median	value	was	46.23	 We	hence	classify	subjects	that	have	an	index	below	the	median	as	being	inequality-averse,	and	those	with	an	index	equal	or	above	the	median	as	being	inequality-tolerant.	 	Let	 us	 now	 consider	 low	 offers—i.e.,	 offers	 less	 than	 or	 equal	 to	 10—and	 test	whether	 inequality-tolerant	 and	 inequality-averse	 subjects	 respond	 differently.	 Overall,	10.7%	 of	 the	 promisees	 accepted	 low	 offers;	 meaning,	 they	 accepted	 no	 or	 negative	premiums	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 breach.	 The	 fraction	 increases	 to	 15.8%	 if	 we	 only	 consider	inequality-averse	subjects.	 		
																																								 																					
23	 In	 DG1	 (DG2),	 37.3%	 (44.3%)	 of	 the	 subjects	 did	 not	 act	 as	 self-interested	 profit-maximizers	 and	 nearly	 all	 deviations	 from	 self-interest	 aimed	 to	 reduce	 the	 distance	between	dictator’s	and	recipient’s	earnings.	Overall,	48.1%	of	the	subjects	acted	selfishly	in	both	DGs.	
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Figure	3:	 	 Acceptance	Rates	of	Low	Offers		 Figure	3	reports	the	acceptance	rate	of	 low	offers	organized	by	the	type	of	subject	(i.e.,	 inequality-averse	 or	 inequality-tolerant)	 and	 by	 the	 type	 of	 breach.	 In	 cases	 of	 gain-seeking	breach,	8.1%	of	inequality-averse	and	3.9%	of	inequality-tolerant	subjects	accepted	low	 offers.	 In	 cases	 of	 loss-avoiding	 breach,	 the	 numbers	 more	 than	 doubled:	 21.8%	 of	inequality-averse	 subjects	 accepted	 a	 negative	 or	 zero	 compensation	 premium	 to	 release	the	promisor	 from	the	contract.	Our	data	show	that	 inequality-averse	subjects	accept	 less	generous	 offers	 in	 cases	 of	 loss-avoiding	 breach	 –	 possibly	 to	 prevent	 promisors	 from	incurring	high	losses.	 	Further	 support	 for	 Result	 4	 is	 provided	 by	 a	 probit	 regression	 (Table	 4).	 The	dependent	variable	has	the	value	1	if	a	low	offer	is	accepted	and	0	if	it	is	refused.		
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Dep	var:	Accept(1)/Reject(0)	 Coefficient	 SE	Gain-seeking	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.341		 	 	 	 (0.215)	Inequality-Averse	 	 	 	 0.374	**	 	 (0.188)	Gain-seeking	x	Inequality-averse	 -0.252		 	 	 	 (0.287)	Male	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.246		 	 	 	 (0.155)	Age	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.000		 	 	 	 (0.017)	Experience	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.237	**	 	 (0.110)	Low	Understanding	 	 	 	 0.489	**	 	 (0.200)	N.obs.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 888	 	 		
Notes:	 Probit	 regression	 on	 acceptance	 of	 low	 offers	 (≤ 10),	individual	random	effects.	Symbol	**	indicates	significance	at	the	5%	level.	 Cases	 in	 which	 no	 shocks	 occurred	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	regression.	 Gain-seeking:	 1=gain-seeking	 breach,	 0=loss-avoiding	breach.	 Inequality-averse:	 1=inequality-averse	 promisee,	0=inequality-tolerant	promisee.		
Table	4:	 	 Inequality-Aversion	and	Low	Offers		 	 Regression	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 acceptance	 of	 a	 low	 offer	 is	smaller	 in	 cases	of	 gain-seeking	breaches	 than	 in	 cases	of	 loss-avoiding	breaches	 (i.e.,	 the	negative	 coefficient	 of	 the	 variable	 Gain-seeking),	 but	 the	 effect	 is	 significant	 only	 for	inequality-averse	subjects.24	 The	positive	and	significant	coefficient	of	the	dummy	variable	
Inequality-Averse	 confirms	 the	 intuition	 that	 inequality	 concerns	 correlate	 with	 a	 greater	willingness	 to	accept	 low	offers.	Results	are	robust	 to	a	 series	of	 controls	 for	gender,	age,	experience,	and	understanding.25	
																																								 																					
24	 A	t-test	confirms	that	the	sum	of	the	coefficients	for	Gain-seeking	and	Gain	×	Inequality-
averse	is	highly	significant	(p-value<0.01).	25	 Male	is	a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	for	males	and	0	otherwise;	Age	is	the	age	of	the	subject;	Experience	takes	the	value	1	if	the	subject	is	unexperienced,	2	if	he	participated	in	at	most	 2	 experiments,	 and	 3	 if	 he	 participated	 in	 3	 or	 more	 experiments.	 To	 account	 for	possible	 comprehension	 problems,	we	 considered	 subjects	 that	were	 particularly	 slow	 in	answering	the	control	questions,	and	those	who	made	several	mistakes.	We	attribute	value	1	 to	 the	 dummy	 variable	 Low	 understanding	 for	 all	 subjects	 who	 were	 in	 the	 last	 decile	either	 according	 to	 their	 total	 answering	 time,	 or	 according	 to	 their	 total	 number	 of	mistakes.		
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5.	 	 Discussion	and	Conclusions		 	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 tried	 to	 explain	 the	 disparity	 between	 economic	 analyses	 of	efficient	 breach	 and	 the	 prevailing	 positions	 in	 the	 moral	 philosophy	 of	 contracts.	 We	argued	 that	 a	 more	 nuanced	 economic	 understanding	 of	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 efficient	breach	is	desirable	and	that	behavioral	motives	should	be	taken	into	account	to	understand	lay	 people’s	 intuitions	 under	 different	 breach	 circumstances.	 We	 developed	 a	 new	experimental	paradigm,	dubbed	Contract-Breach	Game,	 to	empirically	 test	 the	desirability	of	 different	 types	 of	 breaches	 under	 specific	 performance.	 The	 experimental	 toolbox	allowed	 us	 to	 have	 a	 control	 over	 all	 the	 relevant	 variables	 in	 a	 way	 that	 would	 not	 be	possible	with	real-world	data.	We	exogenously	manipulated	the	reasons	for	a	breach	–	loss-avoiding	vs	gain-seeking	–	by	introducing	random	shocks.	Our	test	subjects	had	to	bargain	under	 different	 scenarios	 with	 real	 financial	 incentives:	 their	 breaching	 decision	determined	 their	 final	 payments.	 Our	 experimental	 results	 highlight	 that	 loss-avoiding	breaches	are	more	desirable	than	gain-seeking	breaches;	this	is	especially	true	for	subjects	who	display	stronger	egalitarian	preferences.	 	We	acknowledge	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 imitate	real	 life	situation	 in	a	 laboratory,	and	our	experiment	 is	no	exception.	 Indeed,	 in	a	 laboratory	environment,	 subjects	do	not	behave	exactly	as	they	would	have	behaved	in	real	life	situations,	but	still	there	is	much	to	learn	from	their	behavior.	Our	experiment's	results	–	based	on	the	repeated	experience	of	a	one-shot	game	–	are	more	 indicative	of	repeat	players,	who	get	used	to	modifications	and	adjustments	of	contracts,	as	is	the	case	in	many	business	environments.	The	results	of	our	experiment	 indicate	 that	 individuals	 exhibit	 different	 attitudes	 toward	 loss	 avoiding	 and	gain	 seeking	 breaches,	 and	 those	 different	 attitudes	 must	 be	 indicative	 of	 the	 parties'	expectations	from	a	breach	even	in	discrete	breach	cases	between	non-business	parties.26	  Our	 laboratory	 evidence	 shows	 that	 lay	 people's	 intuitions,	 and	 moral	 philosophers'	arguments	regarding	efficient	breach,	are	consistent	with	the	economic	rationale	of	efficient																																									 																					26	 See	 Feldman	 &	 Teichman.	 2010,	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 people's	 reaction	 to	 breach	depends	 among	 other	 things	 on	 the	 type	 of	 the	 contract.	 The	 authors	 show,	 through	experiments,	that	people	are	more	averse	to	a	breach	of	a	negotiated	contract	as	opposed	to	a	standard	form	contract.	
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breach.	Efficiency	arguments	examined	by	Parisi	and	Porat	(2016)	and	moral	values	seem	to	go	hand	 in	hand:	a	 finding	 that	 is	 in	 line	with	Binmore’s	 (2005)	view,	 that	ethics	 is	 the	outcome	of	an	evolutionary	process	that	tends	to	push	the	society	toward	the	equilibrium	which	is	collectively	more	profitable.	 	Our	experimental	findings	and	the	observed	reactions	of	our	subjects	reflect	the	parties'	values	and	expectations	and	may	be	used	to	inform	the	choice	of	remedies	in	different	cases	of	efficient	breach.	Specifically,	we	show	that	individuals	are	more	tolerant	to	loss-avoiding	breaches	 –	 we	 should	 thus	 allow	 loss-avoiding	 breaches	 more	 easily,	 and	 compensatory	damages	 may	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 remedy	 in	 those	 cases.	 Conversely,	individuals	 are	 less	 tolerant	 to	 gain-seeking	 breaches	 –	we	 should	 thus	 discourage	 those	breaches,	and	specific	performance	or	disgorgement	damages	may	become	more	desirable	in	those	cases.	 	As	a	final	observation,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	framework	of	our	experiment,	we	 assumed	 that	 the	 contract	 was	 enforced	 with	 a	 remedy	 of	 specific	 performance	 (a	property	 rule,	 in	 Calabresi	 and	 Melamed's	 (1972)	 terminology),	 rather	 than	 a	 damage	remedy	 (a	 liability	 rule,	 under	 the	 same	 terminology),	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 unique	 good	contracts.27	 As	 previously	 explained,	we	 chose	 specific	 performance	 as	 our	 background	remedy,	because	it	made	the	non-performance	of	the	contract	conditional	on	the	consent	of	both	parties,	rather	than	on	the	promisor	alone.	This	allowed	us	to	measure	the	promisee's	reaction	 to	 loss-avoiding	 and	 gain-seeking	 breaches.	 In	 regimes	 that	 adopt	 a	 damage	remedy,	 rather	 than	 specific	performance,	 the	promisor,	 rather	 than	 the	promisee,	would	have	the	last	word	as	to	whether	performance	takes	place.	In	such	cases,	if	the	performance	of	 the	 contract	 remains	 efficient	 after	 the	 shock,	 the	 promisee	 would	 need	 to	 entice	 the	promisor	 to	perform,	offering	an	additional	payment.	The	direction	of	 the	payment	would	hence	 change:	 promisor	 to	 promisee	 under	 specific	 performance;	 promisee	 to	 promisor	under	damages.	Whether	our	findings	could	hold	when	the	background	remedy	is	damages	is	 a	 question	 that	 warrants	 future	 investigation	 to	 measure	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 change	 in	remedies	on	the	parties’	renegotiation.  																																								 																					27	 In	Continental	Europe,	specific	performance	 is	considered	 to	be	 the	primary	remedy	 in	contracts,	while	 under	 Anglo-American	 common	 law	 expectation	 damages	 is	 the	 primary	remedy.	Under	both	legal	regimes,	however,	the	common	remedy	for	unique	good	contracts	is	specific	performance.	
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Appendix	A:	Tables				 Dep.	Var.:	No	renegotiation		 Pooled	 Sellers	 Buyers		 Model	(1)	 Model	(2)	 Model	(3)	 Model	(4)	Gain-seeking	 	 	 	 	 	 1.276	 ***	 1.537	 ***	 1.022	 **	 	 1.995	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.294)	 	 	 	 	 (0.319)	 	 	 	 	 (0.463)	 	 	 	 	 (0.490)	 	Occurrence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 -0.664	 ***	 -1.267	 **	 	 -0.413	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.248)	 	 	 	 	 (0.525)	 	 	 	 	 (0.311)	 	Occurrence	x	Gain	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 0.029	 **	 	 0.055	 **	 	 0.019	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.012)	 	 	 	 	 (0.026)	 	 	 	 	 (0.015)	 	Male	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 -1.273	 ***	 -0.575	 	 	 	 	 -1.736	 **	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.470)	 	 	 	 	 (0.486)	 	 	 	 	 (0.763)	 	Age	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 0.045	 	 	 	 	 0.053	 **	 	 0.067	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.036)	 	 	 	 	 (0.022)	 	 	 	 	 (0.132)	 	Experience	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 0.473	 	 	 	 	 0.141	 	 	 	 	 0.789	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.353)	 	 	 	 	 (0.400)	 	 	 	 	 (0.535)	 	Low	Understanding	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 1.572	 ***	 1.379	 ***	 1.689	 **	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.486)	 	 	 	 	 (0.507)	 	 	 	 	 (0.725)	 	N.obs.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 948	 	 	 	 	 948	 	 	 	 	 456	 	 	 	 	 492	 	
	
Notes:	 Probit	 regression	 on	 No	 Entrance	 (1=no	 entrance;	 0=entrance)	 with	 individual	random	 effects.	 Symbols	 $***$	 and	 $**$	 indicate	 significance	 at	 the	 1%	 and	 5%,	respectively.	 Occurrence	 indicates	 the	 number	 of	 times	 a	 given	 event	 has	 occurred,	 and	ranges	from	1	to	6.	Male	is	a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	for	males	and	0	otherwise;	Age	is	 the	 age	 of	 the	 subject;	 Experience	 takes	 value	 1	 if	 the	 subject	 is	 inexperienced,	 1	 if	 he	participated	in	at	most	2	experiments,	and	3	if	he	participated	in	3	or	more	experiments.	We	attribute	value	1	to	the	dummy	variable	Low	understanding	for	all	subjects	who	were	in	the	last	decile	either	according	to	their	total	answering	time,	or	according	to	their	total	number	of	mistakes	in	the	control	questions.		
Table	A-1:	 	 Treatment	effect	on	no-entrance	rate	
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Event	 Seller	 	 Buyer	 Total	
Loss-avoiding	breach	 0.721	 ∼	 0.756	 0.739	
	 ∼	 	 ∼	 ∼	
Gain-seeking	breach	 0.669	 ∼	 0.746	 0.723	
Total	 0.710	 ∼	 0.751	 0.731		
Table	A-2:	Rates	of	Success,	Conditional	on	Renegotiation		
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	 Dep.	Var.:	Compensation	Premium		 Pooled	 Sellers	 Buyers		 Model	(1)	 Model	(2)	 Model	(3)	 Model	(4)	Gain-seeking	 	 	 	 	 	 11.544	 ***	 10.576	 ***	 10.745	 ***	 12.58	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.004)	 	 	 	 	 (2.812)	 	 	 	 	 (2.926)	 	 	 	 	 (2.727)	 	 	 	 	Buyer	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 -1.327	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (3.460)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		Buyer	x	Gain	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 2.018	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (3.996)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		Male	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 7.459	 **	 	 7.994	 **	 	 5.433	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (2.905)	 	 	 	 	 (3.753)	 	 	 	 	 (4.249)	 	Age	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 -0.099	 	 	 	 	 -0.237	 	 	 	 	 -0.105	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (0.333)	 	 	 	 	 (0.758)	 	 	 	 	 (0.380)	 	Experience	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 3.85	 *	 	 	 0.07	 	 	 	 	 6.309	 **	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (2.177)	 	 	 	 	 (3.154)	 	 	 	 	 (2.891)	 	Low	Understanding	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 -19.446	 ***	 -31.726	 ***	 -13.364	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 (3.734)	 	 	 	 	 (5.906)	 	 	 	 	 (4.650)	 	N.obs.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 665	 	 	 	 	 665	 	 	 	 	 334	 	 	 	 	 331	 	R-squared	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.043	 	 	 	 	 0.155	 	 	 	 	 0.166	 	 	 	 	 0.166	 	
	
Notes:	 Linear	 regression	 on	 compensation	 premium	 with	 individual	 random	 effects.	Symbols	 $***$,	 $**$,	 and	 $*$	 indicate	 significance	 at	 the	 1%,	 5%	 and	 10%	 level,	respectively.	Test	on	 joint	significance	of	Buyer	and	Buyers	x	Gains	 in	Model	 (2)	p=0.874.	Male	 is	a	dummy	variable	 taking	value	1	 for	males	and	0	otherwise;	Age	 is	 the	age	of	 the	subject;	Experience	 takes	value	1	 if	 the	 subject	 is	 inexperienced,	1	 if	he	participated	 in	at	most	2	experiments,	and	3	if	he	participated	in	3	or	more	experiments.	We	attribute	value	1	to	the	dummy	variable	Low	understanding	for	all	subjects	who	were	in	the	last	decile	either	according	 to	 their	 total	 answering	 time,	or	according	 to	 their	 total	number	of	mistakes	 in	the	control	questions.		
Table	A-3:	 	 Treatment	Effect	on	Compensation	Premium		 	
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Appendix	B:	Experimental	Instructions	
(not	for	publication)	Here	we	report	the	instructions	for	the	“Seller”	treatment.	Instructions	for	the	“Buyer”	treatment	are	available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	The	parts	in	[italics]	were	red	by	the	experimenter,	but	not	printed	on	the	subjects’	copy	of	the	instructions.		
Instructions		Welcome.	The	purpose	of	this	study	is	to	investigate	how	people	make	decisions.	From	now	until	the	end	of	the	study,	any	communication	with	other	participants	is	not	allowed.	If	you	have	a	question,	please	raise	your	hand	and	one	of	us	will	come	to	your	desk	to	answer	it.	In	 this	 experiment,	 you	 will	 be	 able	 to	 earn	 money	 depending	 on	 your	 choices	 and	 the	choices	of	the	other	participants.	Upon	completion	of	the	study,	the	amount	you	earned	will	be	 paid	 to	 you	 in	 cash.	 Payments	 are	 confidential;	 no	 other	 participant	 will	 be	 told	 the	amount	you	earned.	All	earnings	are	expressed	in	tokens,	which	will	be	converted	to	Euros	at	the	end	of	the	study	at	the	rate	of	1	Euro	=	20	tokens.	In	 this	study	there	will	be	 two	parts:	 I	am	now	about	 to	read	the	 instructions	 for	 the	 first	part.	
	
Instructions	for	Part	1	
Roles	and	tasks:	At	the	beginning	of	the	study,	each	participant	will	be	assigned	one	of	two	roles:	Seller	or	Buyer.	Half	of	you	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	Seller,	and	half	of	you	will	be	assigned	 the	role	of	Buyer.	Your	roles	will	be	generated	by	 the	computer	and	will	 remain	fixed	 throughout	 the	 the	 study.	 Each	 Seller	will	 be	matched	with	 one	Buyer,	 and	 the	 two	parties	will	be	involved	in	a	transaction.	The	Seller	produces	a	good,	and	the	expected	production	cost	for	each	good	is	equal	to	80	 tokens.	The	Buyer	expects	 to	 receive	a	benefit	of	100	 tokens	 from	the	purchase	of	 the	good.	The	transaction	is	articulated	in	five	phases.	
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Phase	 1:	 Contract.	 The	 good	 is	 sold	 by	 the	 Seller	 to	 the	 Buyer,	 at	 a	 price	 of	 90	 tokens.	 	On	the	left	side	of	the	screen,	you	can	see	that	the	price	is	90	and	the	production	cost	is	80,	so	the	Sellers	earnings	from	the	contract	will	be	10	tokens	(price	minus	production	cost).	Likewise,	on	the	right	side	of	the	screen,	you	will	see	that	the	price	is	90	and	the	benefit	to	the	Buyer	is	100,	so	the	Buyers	earnings	from	the	contract	will	also	be	10	tokens	(benefit	minus	price).	In	 this	 phase	 of	 the	 experiment,	 there	 are	 no	 decisions	 to	 make,	 and	 the	 contract	 is	binding	for	both	parties.	[Please,	press	OK.]	
Phase	2:	Variation	in	the	initial	conditions.	In	this	phase	of	the	experiment,	there	can	be	a	change	in	the	initial	conditions	presented	in	phase	1.	There	are	three	possible	scenarios:	A. The	 production	 costs	 of	 the	 Sellers	 unexpectedly	 increase	 from	 80	 tokens	 to	 110	tokens.	 In	 this	 case,	 if	 the	 contract	 is	 performed	 as	 promised,	 the	 Seller	 loses	 20	tokens	(price	minus	production	costs),	while	the	Buyer	still	earns	10	tokens.	[Please,	
press	OK].	B. The	 Seller	 finds	 a	 better	 selling	 opportunity;	 that	 is,	 he	 could	 sell	 the	 good	 to	 a	different	 buyer	 at	 the	 higher	 price	 of	 110	 tokens.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 Seller	 earns	 10	tokens	if	he	performs	the	contract	as	promised.	 If	 the	Seller	breaches	the	contract,	he	earns	30	 tokens	by	selling	 the	good	 to	 the	new	buyer	(at	a	price	of	110	 tokens	minus	 his	 production	 cost	 of	 80	 tokens);	 however,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 original	 Buyer	would	earn	0	tokens,	as	someone	else	will	get	to	buy	the	good	in	his	place.	C. Nothing	changes	with	respect	to	Phase	1.	Both	parties	are	informed	if	any	variation	in	the	initial	conditions	occurred.	Please	note	that	if	 the	contract	 is	performed	as	promised,	 the	earnings	 for	 the	Buyer	remain	 the	same	(10	tokens)	 in	all	 three	situations.	 If	 the	contract	 is	not	performed,	the	Buyer	 loses	his	benefit	from	 the	 contract	 and	 obtains	 0	 tokens,	 plus	 whatever	 compensation	 is	 agreed	 upon	 in	Phase	3.	[Please,	press	OK]	
Phase	3:	Perform	the	contract	or	ask	for	a	renegotiation.	The	Seller	cannot	breach	the	contract,	without	the	consent	of	the	Buyer.	The	Seller	has	two	options:	he	can	perform	the	contract	as	promised	in	Phase	1	or	he	can	renegotiate	the	contract.	• If	 the	contract	 is	performed	as	promised	the	Buyer	earns	10	tokens	and	the	Seller	earns	either	10	tokens	(under	scenarios	B	and	C)	or	-	20	tokens	(under	scenario	A).	
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If	 the	 Seller	 decides	 to	 fulfill	 the	 contract,	 the	 transaction	 is	 completed	 (i.e.,	 the	Buyer	and	the	Seller	will	not	enter	into	Phase	4);	• If	 the	Seller	asks	 to	 renegotiate	 the	 contract	he	 can	make	an	offer	 to	 the	Buyer	as	compensation	for	breaching	the	contract.	In	this	case,	the	Buyer	and	the	Seller	enter	into	Phase	4	(renegotiation).	If	 the	 renegotiation	 leads	 to	 an	 agreement	 between	 the	 two	 parties,	 then	 the	 original	contract	is	cancelled	and	is	replaced	by	the	new	agreement.	Under	scenarios	A	and	C,	if	the	original	 contract	 is	 breached	 the	 good	 is	 not	 produced	 and	 the	 Seller	 does	 not	 bear	 any	production	cost	(and	does	not	get	any	payment	for	selling	the	good,	since	there	is	no	good	to	sell).	Under	scenario	B,	if	the	original	contract	is	breached	the	Seller	can	produce	the	good	and	sell	it	to	the	external	buyer.	If	the	Seller	and	the	Buyer	do	not	reach	an	agreement,	the	original	contract	is	performed	as	promised.	
Phase	 4:	 Renegotiation.	 Parties	 have	 4	 rounds	 of	 renegotiation	 available	 to	modify	 the	original	contract.	Parties	will	alternate	in	making	offers	and	counter-offers.	If	no	agreement	is	reached	by	the	end	of	the	4th	round,	the	original	contract	is	implemented.	• In	 the	 first	 round	 of	 renegotiation,	 the	 Seller	 can	 make	 an	 offer	 to	 the	 Buyer	 as	compensation	 for	 breaching	 the	 contract.	 The	 Seller	 has	 30	 seconds	 to	 make	 his	decision:	you	can	see	 the	remaining	 time	on	the	 top	of	your	screen.	The	minimum	offer	is	0	and	the	maximum	offer	is	20.	[Note:	Please,	look	at	the	screen:	can	you	see	a	
red	cursor?	To	make	an	offer	you	simply	need	to	move	the	cursor]	– Example	 1:	 suppose	 you	 are	 the	 Seller	 and	 your	 production	 costs	 have	increased.	 Suppose	 you	want	 to	make	 an	offer	 of	 5	 tokens	 to	 the	Buyer	 to	breach	the	contract.	[Please,	move	the	cursor	so	to	set	an	offer	of	5.]	 	 	How	much	would	you	earn	in	this	case?	 	 	If	the	Buyer	accepts	the	offer,	the	contract	 is	not	performed	and	you	lose	5	tokens	 (i.e.,	 the	 amount	 you	 offered	 as	 compensation	 to	 the	 Seller	 for	breaching	the	contract).	[Note:	your	earnings	are	reported	on	the	right	side	of	
the	 screen].	 On	 the	 bottom-left	 side	 of	 the	 screen	 you	 can	 see	 a	 graph	reporting	 the	offer	 for	 each	 renegotiation	 round;	 the	 graph	will	 display	 all	the	offers	and	counter-offers.	[The	purple	cue	in	the	graph	moves	as	the	offer	
changes.]	In	this	case,	the	Buyer	earns	5	tokens.	 	 	
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If	 the	 Buyer	 refuses	 your	 offer,	 there	 will	 be	 3	 additional	 rounds	 of	renegotiating.	How	much	do	you	earn	if	you	don’t	reach	an	agreement	by	the	end	of	the	last	renegotiation	round?	Your	earnings	are	equal	to	-	20	tokens	(i.e.,	you	will	face	a	loss	of	20).	That	is,	because	you	received	90	tokens	(i.e.,	the	price	in	the	original	contract),	but	you	faced	a	cost	of	110	tokens	(i.e.,	the	production	 costs	 after	 the	unexpected	variation).	The	Buyers	 earnings	will	remain	 equal	 to	 10	 tokens,	 as	 in	 the	 original	 contract.	 [You	 can	 find	 your	
earnings	for	this	case	in	the	right	part	of	the	screen.]	 	 	If	you	do	not	press	OK	within	the	30	seconds	your	offer	is	not	transmitted	to	the	 Seller.	 In	 the	 left	 part	 of	 the	 screen	 you	 can	 see	 a	 graph	 with	 the	renegotiation	round	and	 the	corresponding	offer:	 the	graph	will	display	all	the	 offers	 and	 counter-offers.	 [Can	 you	 see	 that	 the	 purple	 cursor	moves	 as	
you	change	the	offer?	Please,	press	OK.]	– Example	2:	Suppose	you	are	 the	Seller	and	you	have	 found	a	better	selling	opportunity.	Suppose	you	want	to	make	an	offer	of	5	tokens	to	the	Buyer	to	breach	the	contract	and	be	able	to	sell	the	good	to	a	new	buyer	for	a	higher	profit.	[Please,	move	the	cursor	so	to	set	an	offer	of	5	tokens.]	 	 	How	much	would	you	earn	in	this	case?	 	 	If	the	Buyer	accepts	the	offer,	you	can	breach	the	original	contract	and	you	can	sell	the	good	at	the	higher	price.	Your	earnings	in	this	case	are	equal	to	25	tokens.	Why	25	tokens?	From	the	new	contract	you	earn	30	tokens	(110	tokens	 from	 the	new	higher	 selling	 price	 -	 80	 tokens	 of	 production	 costs).	You	have	to	pay	5	tokens	to	the	Buyer	to	breach	the	original	contracts;	hence	you	earn	30	tokens	(from	the	new	contract)	-	5	tokens	(compensation	paid	to	Buyer	to	breach	the	initial	contract)	[Note:	your	earnings	are	reported	on	
the	 right	 side	 of	 the	 screen].	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 Buyer	 earns	 5	 tokens.	 If	 the	Buyer	rejects	your	offer,	there	will	be	3	additional	rounds	of	renegotiation.	 	How	much	do	you	earn	if	you	don’t	reach	an	agreement	by	the	end	of	the	last	renegotiation	 round?	 Your	 earnings	 are	 equal	 to	 90	 tokens	 (price	 in	 the	original	 contract)	 -	 80	 tokens	 (production	 costs)	 =	 10	 tokens.	 The	 Buyers	earning	 are	 equal	 to	 10	 tokens,	 as	 in	 the	 original	 contract.	 [Note:	 you	 can	
read	the	earnings	for	the	case	of	renegotiation	failure	on	the	bottom-right	side	
of	the	screen].	[Please,	press	OK.]	 	 	
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Please	 recall	 that	 the	Seller	have	30	seconds	 to	 state	his	offer.	 If	 the	Seller	does	not	press	OK	within	30	seconds,	the	offer	will	be	equal	to	0	tokens.	• In	the	second	round	of	renegotiation,	the	Buyer	is	 informed	about	the	Sellers	offer	and	has	to	decide	whether	to	accept	or	reject	it.	If	he	accepts	the	offer,	the	original	contract	is	cancelled	and	renegotiation	ends.	If	he	rejects	the	offer,	he	has	to	state	a	counter-offer.	The	Buyer	has	10	seconds	to	decides	whether	to	accept	or	reject:	if	he	takes	no	 action	within	10	 seconds	 the	 offer	 is	 automatically	 rejected.	 If	 the	Buyer	rejects	the	offer,	than	he	has	30	seconds	to	state	a	counter-offer.	If	the	Buyer	do	not	press	OK	within	30	seconds,	the	offer	will	be	equal	to	20	tokens.	• In	the	third	round	of	renegotiation,	the	Seller	is	informed	about	the	Buyers	counter-offer	and	has	to	decide	whether	to	accept	or	reject	it.	If	he	accepts	the	counter-offer,	the	original	contract	 is	cancelled	and	renegotiation	ends.	 If	he	rejects	 the	counter-offer,	he	has	 to	state	a	new	offer.	The	Seller	has	10	seconds	 to	decides	whether	 to	accept	or	 reject:	 if	 he	 takes	no	action	within	10	 seconds	 the	offer	 is	 automatically	rejected.	 If	 the	 Seller	 rejects	 the	 offer,	 than	 he	 has	 30	 seconds	 to	 state	 a	 counter-offer.	If	the	Seller	does	not	press	OK	within	30	seconds,	the	offer	will	be	equal	to	0	tokens.	• In	 the	 fourth	 round	of	 renegotiating,	 the	Buyer	 is	 informed	 about	 the	 Sellers	 new	offer	and	has	to	decide	whether	to	accept	it	or	to	reject	 it.	 If	 the	Buyer	accepts	the	offer,	 the	 original	 contract	 is	 cancelled.	 If	 the	 new	 offer	 is	 rejected,	 the	 original	contract	 is	performed.	Regardless	of	 the	choice	made	by	the	Buyer,	 this	 last	round	ends	 the	 renegotiation,	 and	 Phase	 4	 ends.	 The	 Buyer	 has	 10	 seconds	 to	 decides	whether	 to	 accept	 or	 reject:	 if	 he	 takes	 no	 action	 within	 10	 seconds	 the	 offer	 is	automatically	rejected.	
Phase	 5:	 Earnings.	 The	 screen	will	 display	 your	 earnings	 for	 the	 period,	 the	 cumulated	earnings,	and	the	earnings	of	your	counterpart	for	the	period.	We	now	ask	you	to	answer	a	few	questions,	to	verify	that	the	instructions	given	so	far	are	clear	for	everybody.	The	answers	you	give	to	these	questions	will	not	affect	your	earnings	in	any	way.	
Periods,	groups,	and	private	account.	The	 task	will	be	 repeated	 for	18	periods.	 In	each	period	the	computer	will	 form	groups	of	 two	–	one	Seller	and	one	Buyer.	You	can	see	 the	number	 of	 the	 current	 period	 in	 the	 upper-left	 corner	 of	 the	 screen.	 In	 Phase	 2	 of	 each	
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period,	 one	 of	 the	 three	 scenarios	 (A,	 B,	 or	 C)	 occurs.	 The	 sequence	 of	 the	 events	 is	predetermined	 by	 the	 computer	 and	 cannot	 be	 influenced	 in	 any	 way	 by	 your	 previous	actions.	At	the	beginning	of	the	first	period,	an	endowment	of	150	tokens	will	be	deposited	in	your	private	account.	Per-period	earnings	will	cumulate	in	your	account	as	well.	In	case	you	were	to	suffer	a	loss	in	a	period,	the	tokens	will	be	subtracted	from	your	private	account.	In	the	upper-right	part	of	the	screen,	you	can	see	the	balance	of	tokens	in	your	private	account.	
To	sum	up.	At	the	beginning	of	the	experiment,	you	will	be	randomly	assigned	to	the	role	of	Seller	 or	 Buyer:	 the	 roles	will	 remain	 fixed	 throughout	 the	 experiment.	 There	will	 be	 18	periods,	 and	 at	 the	beginning	of	 each	period	 the	 computer	will	match	one	 Seller	 and	one	Buyer.	In	each	period:	• The	contract	is	signed;	• There	 can	 be	 a	 change	 in	 the	 initial	 conditions	 for	 the	 Seller:	 an	 increase	 in	 the	production	 costs	 or	 a	 better	 outside	 selling	 opportunity.	 The	 occurrence	 of	 each	event	is	predetermined	by	the	computer	and	does	not	depend	in	any	way	from	your	previous	choices.	You	cannot	know	in	advance	the	future	sequence	of	events;	• The	 Seller	 can	 perform	 the	 original	 contract	 as	 promised	 or	 renegotiate	 the	agreement	with	the	Buyer;	• There	will	be	at	most	4	rounds	of	renegotiation.	The	Seller	will	make	the	first	offer	to	breach	the	contract.	 If	 there	is	no	agreement	at	the	end	of	the	fourth	round,	the	original	contract	is	performed.	Earnings	 accumulate	 from	 period	 to	 period	 and	 are	 added	 to	 (or	 subtracted	 from)	 your	private	 account.	 [Is	 everything	 clear?]	 Before	 starting,	 please	 answer	 a	 few	 additional	questions.			 	
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Instructions	for	Part	2	
Decision	task.	In	this	part	you	must	decide	how	to	allocate	some	tokens.	You	have	to	take	two	decisions:	one	for	scenario	1	and	the	other	for	scenario	2.	In	Figure	1	you	can	see	scenario	1:	each	cell	represents	a	possible	allocation.	Please	look	at	the	first	cell	in	the	upper-left	corner:	in	this	distribution	you	get	0	tokens	and	the	other	gets	30.	 In	 the	 next	 allocation,	 you	 get	 1	 and	 the	 other	 gets	 29.	 In	 the	 last	 allocation,	 in	 the	bottom-right	corner,	you	get	20	and	the	other	gets	10.	To	select	the	favorite	allocation,	you	have	to	press	on	the	desired	cell	and	confirm	your	choice.	 	
	
FIGURE	1:	SCENARIO	1		Let	us	now	consider	scenario	2	in	Figure	2.	As	before,	each	cell	represents	a	given	allocation	of	tokens	between	you	and	another	participant.	Please	look	at	the	first	cell	in	the	upper-left	corner:	in	this	distribution	you	get	0	tokens	and	the	other	gets	0.	In	the	next	allocation,	you	get	1	and	the	other	loses	1	token.	In	the	last	allocation,	in	the	bottom-right	corner,	you	get	20	and	the	other	loses	20	tokens.	
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FIGURE	2:	SCENARIO	2		
Groups	 and	 earnings.	 Each	 one	 of	 you	will	 take	 2	 decisions:	 one	 for	 each	 scenario.	 The	computer	will	forms	randomly	groups	of	two	and	only	one	decision	for	each	group	will	be	carried	over.	The	implemented	choice	could	hence	be	your	choice	or	the	choice	of	the	other	person	in	your	group.	In	addition,	the	relevant	choice	could	be	the	one	for	scenario	either	1	or	2.	You	will	know	whether	your	choice	will	be	implemented	only	at	the	end	of	the	studio;	please	pay	attention	to	all	your	choices.		 	
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Appendix	3:	Screenshots	
(not	for	publication)	Here	we	present	the	screenshots	of	three	possible	scenarios	presented	to	subjects	in	Part	1	of	the	experiment,	under	the	“Seller”	treatment.	
	
FIGURE	3:	SCENARIO	A	–	INCREASE	IN	PRODUCTION	COSTS	
	
FIGURE	4:	SCENARIO	B	–	BETTER	SELLING	OPPORTUNITY	
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FIGURE	5:	SCENARIO	C	–	NOTHING	CHANGES	
 
